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Until the late nineteenth century, the profession of scientist in
Western societies was comprised almost exclusively of men from
the propertied classes or bourgeoisie who were educated at the
elite European universities. It was a calling of sorts, not unlike
the ministry, for those with means and pedigree who could afford
the luxury of investigating the workings of the universe by
expanding and challenging their intellect. There was no vast
wealth to be made—maybe a comfortable living at the peak of
one’s career.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States spends more on health care than any other country
in the world.2 The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) helps drive
health care costs higher by awarding monopolies to scientific researchers
whose inventions meet the requirements dictated by Title 35 of the U.S.
Code.3 Once the PTO awards such a monopoly, the inventor is the only
party legally entitled to make, use, or sell the invention in the United
States.4 Though monopolies are thought to impair competition,5 under
1. Sheldon Krimsky, The Profit of Scientific Discovery and Its Normative
Implications, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 15 (1999).
2. Health spending per capita in the United States was $4600 in 2000
(approximately $1.3 trillion total—13% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)). The
United States spends more percentage wise on health care than Germany (10.6% of
GDP), Canada (9.1%), Japan (7.8%), and the United Kingdom (7.3%). Alliance for
Health Reform, Covering Health Issues: A Sourcebook for Journalists (2003), at
http://www.allhealth.org/sourcebook2002/ch8_tc.html (last updated Jan. 2003). The
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services estimates that by 2011 the percentage of
GDP spent on the nation’s health will rise to 17%. Stephen Heffler et al., Health Spending
Projections for 2001–2011: The Latest Outlook, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 2002, at 207,
210. Congress has attempted to address these skyrocketing costs, and in 2002, the Senate
passed a bill granting consumers better access to generic versions of patented drugs once
the patents expired. However, opposition to the measure in the House of Representatives
(including input from the Bush administration as well as major drug companies) resulted
in the defeat of the legislation. Alliance for Health Reform, supra. By comparison, the
federal government spent almost $301 billion on national defense in 2000. The White
House: Office of Management and Budget, The Budget for Fiscal Year 2002, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/bud02.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2003).
3. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2000).
4. See id. § 271. Strictly speaking, the patent allows the holder to prevent others
from making, using, or selling the invention, but does not itself provide a legal right to
use it herself (there may be legal prohibitions on the use of the patented device or the
class to which it belongs). Regardless, the PTO has allowed a radar detector (whose
only use is to evade speeding tickets) to be patented, and a court has upheld the patent.
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the U.S. system these exclusionary rights are the rewards an inventor
earns in exchange for enriching the pool of publicly available
technology.6 Perhaps in part because of the United States’ historic
resistance to monopolies, the PTO has always required the patent
applicant to provide a significant amount of disclosure before a patent is
granted. Recently though, the Federal Circuit7 made it easier for
researchers to patent deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)8 sequences9 by
See Whistler Corp. v. Autotronics, Inc., No. CA3-85-2573-D, 1988 WL 212501, at *1,
*2, *4, *5 (N.D. Tex. July 28, 1988).
5. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000,
or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in
the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2.
6. This quid pro quo lies at the heart of the U.S. patent system and has played a
role in the Federal Circuit’s consideration of the written description requirements. See,
e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 285 F.3d 1013, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2002),
vacated by 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This exchange trades the monopolistic rights
granted the patent holder for the public disclosure of the technology, thereby increasing
the total technology available for public use. ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVIS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT IN A NUTSHELL § 1.3,
at 15 (2d ed. 1990). This exchange is often justified by either of the two theories behind
the U.S. patent system: the “bargain” theory or the “natural rights” theory. Id. at 14–15.
Under the bargain theory, the monopoly is the incentive provided to induce the pursuit of
new inventions. Id. Under the natural rights theory, the inventor is the rightful owner of
her invention, and the monopoly is the compensation awarded to encourage disclosure.
Id.
7. The Federal Circuit holds exclusive appellate jurisdiction in cases brought
under the Patent Act. MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 6, § 7.10, at 119.
8. DNA consists of phosphoric acid, a five-carbon sugar, D(-)2-deoxyribose, and
a nitrogen base. NORMAN V. ROTHWELL, UNDERSTANDING GENETICS 217 (1993). The
base is either a purine (adenine or guanine) or a pyrimidine (thymine or cytosine). Id.
Individual DNA molecules are commonly referred to by the identity of the base: “A” for
molecules containing adenine, “G” for those containing guanine, “T” for thymine, and
“C” for cytosine. Id. The information-carrying capacity of DNA is a function of the
selective binding of the component bases—while any of the bases A,T,C, or G can bind
to each other in the same strand, DNA in its native form has a two-strand, double-helix
structure. This double-helix structure is a combination of a “coding” or “sense”
(specifying which amino acids are to be joined) and a “complementary” (noncoding)
strand. Hydrogen bonding binds the strands together, and the bonding between one base
and its corresponding base from the opposite strand is strictly controlled; As always bind
to Ts and Gs always bind to Cs. Id. at 220. For example:
If a given strand is composed of these bases:
ATGCGCGCAT
The complementary strand would look like this: T A C G C G C G T A
Discrete segments of these strands in turn code for the amino acids that make up

905

GIBSON.DOC

9/17/2019 11:23 AM

relaxing the disclosure requirements10 for those types of patents.
These decreased disclosure requirements for DNA sequence patents
threaten anyone who either pays for or receives health care in the United
States. Recipients of U.S. health care face impeded development of new
drugs and treatments because fear of patent infringement stifles innovation.
Those paying for U.S. health care face increased out-of-pocket expenses,
because the PTO will likely issue more DNA sequence patents as DNA
sequence patentability standards are lessened. This increase in the
issuance of DNA sequence patents will trigger spiraling transaction
costs11 because, as the “unfenced” stretches of our genome12 are enclosed,
the expense of research and commercial development increases. This
chill on scientific progress is at odds with the original purpose of the
U.S. patent system.
In accordance with the goal of promoting the “useful Arts” set forth in
the Constitution,13 35 U.S.C. § 112 states the disclosure standards an
applicant must meet to gain a patent.14 Included are the requirements of
enablement (to enable a practitioner of ordinary skill in the art to
practice the invention),15 best mode (describing the inventor’s favored
proteins. These proteins form the tissues that compose the human body. Id. at 502. As a
complete DNA blueprint for a human being is present in almost all human cells, each
cell contains an extremely long strand of DNA (approximately two meters). When
multiplied by the average number of cells in the human body, the total length of DNA
present in each adult human is approximately 2*10^14 meters, a length of over a thousand
times greater than the distance between the Earth and the Sun (1.5*10^11 meters).
ALBERT L. LEHNINGER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF BIOCHEMISTRY WITH AN EXTENDED
DISCUSSION OF OXYGEN-BINDING PROTEINS 794 (1993).
9. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(holding that the public deposit of a DNA sequence may help satisfy the writtendescription requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112).
10. These disclosure requirements ensure the inventor adequately informs the
public of the invention. See infra note 14.
11. The expenses of information development, negotiation, and enforcement are
transactions costs typically associated with the making of and compliance with business
contracts. Paul M. Johnson, Glossary of Political Economy Terms, at http://www.
auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/transaction_costs.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2003).
12. “Genome” refers to the genetic content comprising all the DNA in a single set
of chromosomes. ROTHWELL, supra note 8, at 18.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14. The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and
of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains,
or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall
set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
15. Id. The theory behind the enablement requirement is preventing the applicant
from claiming subject matter she has not “taught” to the public. See In re Fisher, 427
F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970). The enablement requirement has remained fairly static
in its judicial interpretation. In 1853, the Supreme Court applied the requirement to
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embodiment of her invention),16 and written description (demonstrating
the inventor “possesses” what she is claiming).17 Since the first Patent
Act, federal courts have been the final determiners of what these
patentability standards actually require, providing a judicial lens through
which Title 35 must be viewed.
In April 2002, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed
the decision of the District Court for the Southern District of New York
in Enzo Biochem v. Gen-Probe Inc.18 The Federal Circuit found that, as
a matter of law, the deposit of a DNA sample in a public depository did
not satisfy the written description requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph.19 Despite petition from Gen-Probe, the court declined to
rehear the case en banc, inspiring dissents from Judges Rader, Linn, and
Gajarsa.20 Unfortunately, the court reversed itself three months later,21
stating that its prior decision finding a public deposit inadequate was
incorrect.22
This Comment warns of the possible effects of the Federal Circuit’s
decision on DNA sequence patents and the life science industry.23
While the court’s action may further some of the policy goals that drive
Samuel Morse’s patent claims and found Morse’s claim to the use of any type of
electromagnetism to communicate invalid for failure to adequately teach the claimed use.
See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853). Because Morse had not
enabled the use of any type of electromagnetism, that particular claim failed. Id.
16. 35 U.S.C. § 112. The best mode requirement compels the inventor to disclose
the best mode of which he is aware. Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1050
(Fed. Cir. 1995). Thus, while enablement entails an objective analysis as to the
knowledge of one ordinarily skilled in the art, best mode suggests a subjective analysis
as to what the inventor knew. Id.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 112; see also In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967). The
written description has been variously employed throughout its history. Historically, the
written description informed the public of what exactly the inventor claimed to have
invented. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 434 (1822). In 1870, the written description
function was supplanted by statute with the practice of including “claims” in the patent
application. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 379 (1996).
18. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 285 F.3d 1013, 1023–24 (Fed. Cir.
2002), vacated by 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
19. Id. at 1015–16.
20. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
21. Id. at 960.
22. Id.
23. By “life science industry” I am referring to pharmaceutical companies, such as
Glaxo Wellcome, biotechnology companies, such as Amgen or Genentech, and
genomics companies, such as Celera. See Alexander K. Haas, The Wellcome Trust’s
Disclosures of Gene Sequence Data into the Public Domain & the Potential for
Proprietary Rights in the Human Genome, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 145, 148–50 (2001).
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our system of intellectual property protection,24 such a radical departure
from the traditional quid pro quo25 long demanded by the U.S. patent
system could fatally disturb the equilibrium so carefully developed over
the last 200 years. While the U.S. system is based on certainty and
disclosure, Enzo could very well usher in a new era of smoke and
mirrors; though wonderfully enabling,26 the public deposit of a DNA
sequence does not adequately describe the researcher’s invention. In short,
public deposits give the public the proverbial fish instead of teaching us
how to catch our own.27
The lower standards for DNA sequence patentability indicated by
Enzo will impact several areas over the short-term. By patenting
unsequenced28 DNA samples, applicants merely shift the burden of
identifying those sequences to others. This shift will create an informational
vacuum and force the other players in the field, including researchers,
venture capitalists, the court system, and the PTO, to shoulder the
burden of determining DNA sequence patent boundaries themselves.
Over a somewhat longer timeline, Enzo will encourage scientists to
prematurely patent basic research, thus driving up health care expenditures
by inflating transaction costs because every DNA sequence patent is a
licensing agreement29 eagerly waiting to blossom. Further, as in any case
where multiple parties claim discrete portions of a common resource,
there is the very real danger of a “tragedy of the anticommons”30 arising
in such situations. The sheer volume of coordination, negotiation, and
license agreements required to utilize the resource drives the cost
prohibitively high, thereby discouraging research and stalling progress.
With regard to our genomic heritage,31 the stakes are simply too high to
24. These policy goals include facilitating the spread of new technologies. Janice
M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to
Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 617 (1998). By making it
easier to meet the requirements for patentability, it is at least arguable that the Federal
Circuit’s Enzo decision encouraged patenting new inventions, thus bringing more
technology into the public domain.
25. See supra note 6.
26. The public deposit enables any competent researcher to practice the invention
and study the sequence by contacting the depository and obtaining a sample of the
patented sequence.
27. The Quotations Page, Chinese Proverb, at http://www.quotationspage.com/
quotes/Chinese_Proverb (last visited Apr. 5, 2003).
28. “Sequencing” DNA means determining the exact chemical structure of the
sequence, such as GGTCACCA etc. See ROTHWELL, supra note 8, at 487–90.
29. Licensing agreements are contracts granting nonpatent holders rights to the
patent. MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 6, § 1.2, at 13.
30. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243–44
(1968); see also infra note 194 and accompanying text.
31. The effects of DNA-based treatments and diagnostics will forever change the
human race by providing doctors previously unimaginable capabilities. This power will
impact our genomic future as the world community decides to either pursue or forego
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allow shortsighted commercial considerations to subsume the promise
that free discourse in this resource can fulfill.
Part II of the Comment addresses the history of the U.S. patent system
as well as the origins and current state of the written description
requirement; while the requirement dates to the first patent act, judicial
interpretation of it has changed considerably over the last 200 years.
Part III focuses on the Federal Circuit’s Enzo decision, which relegated
the written description requirement to the supporting cast at a time when
it should assume the lead role in limiting and clarifying DNA sequence
patents. Part IV describes how the Federal Circuit’s decision may affect
U.S. patent law as well as the U.S. life science industry. Part V offers
suggestions as to what can be done to improve the current disclosure
regime, including returning to the written description requirement as
applied pre-Enzo. Finally, the Comment recommends several means to
alleviate the problems Enzo raised, through the judicial process or
alternatively by proactive life science industry action, such as mandatory
cross licensing32 and the creation of patent pools.33
II. U.S. PATENT LAW AND THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT
A. English Origins of the U.S. System
Just as the modern United States, medieval England sculpted public
policy in hopes of promoting economic development.34 Long before the
Pilgrims sighted Plymouth Rock, the English Crown granted privileges
to merchant and craft guilds to encourage their pursuit of new
technologies and trade and to make available to the public the fruits of
those pursuits.35 However, these early grants benefited the public only
in the sense that they could purchase the resulting products; the public
did not gain access to new technologies from these grants until the midfourteenth century36 when the Crown began requiring the holder to
certain avenues of genomics-based research or treatment.
32. Cross-licensing is the granting of patent licenses between competitors to
facilitate technological development. Joel I. Klein, Address Before the American
Intellectual Property Law Association (May 2, 1997), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1123.htm.
33. Patent pools are aggregations of patent rights subject to cross-licensing. Id.
34. FLOYD L. VAUGHAN, THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM 13 (1956).
35. OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE 20 (Patent
Office Society 1936).
36. The timing coincided with the rise of England’s textile industry. VAUGHAN,
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instruct others in his improved methods.37 This system continued until
the late fifteenth century, when the Tudor dynasty replaced this focus on
national progress with a new aim—filling the Royal coffers.38
The Statute of Monopolies reconciled the Royal practice of granting
patents for its own gain with Parliament’s desire to preserve competition.39
The Statute proscribed monopolies as contrary to English law, with an
important exception40—patents could be granted to inventors bringing
forth new technologies for the public benefit.41
B. The U.S. Patent System
“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”42
So provided the Constitution, and Congress quickly exercised this
power, passing the first Patent Act in 1790.43

supra note 34, at 13. England was quick to recognize the power that commercial
development could create and encouraged the spread of technologies that increased
economic efficiency. Id.
37. Id. at 13. These early grants were usually for new methods of working cloth.
Indeed, by 1337, this policy was codified, granting textile workers from outside Britain
the right to special privileges, provided they immigrated to England in order to practice
and teach their crafts. Id.
38. Id. at 14. This sea change in national policy replaced the traditional system (a
limited monopoly granted in exchange for benefiting the public) with a new
consideration for the sovereign—cash or services. OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE, supra note 35, at 20. As the Crown granted these
monopolies, competition disappeared and prices crept steadily upward. VAUGHAN,
supra note 34, at 14. Eventually these monopolies impacted the market to the extent that
the cost of staple products, such as salt and paper, increased geometrically. Id. Not until
1601 was English attention refocused on the original aim of these grants, the promotion
of national industry. OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE,
supra note 35, at 29. Even at that point, the refocusing was only as a side effect of the
political scrum between Parliament and the Crown. Id. Under legislative pressure,
Elizabeth I cancelled many patents and monopolies and submitted those remaining to
judicial review (by courts of law, not equity). VAUGHAN, supra note 34, at 14. Despite
Elizabeth’s actions, the situation continued to deteriorate, and Royal abuse of patent
grants continued under James I (ascended in 1603) until 1623, when Parliament passed
the Statute of Monopolies. Id. at 15.
39. MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 6, § 1.1, at 5.
40. This exception provides the basis for English patent doctrine, and thus U.S.
doctrine as well, as English patent doctrine was a well-entrenched aspect of the common
law that the English colonists carried with them into the New World. VAUGHAN, supra
note 34, at 13.
41. OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE, supra note
35, at 31–32.
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
43. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 127–28 (2d ed. 2000).
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1. The Written Description Requirement
Though the current version of the disclosure requirement was codified
in 1952,44 U.S. patent applicants have always been obliged to precisely
describe their inventions.45 As early as 1822, the Supreme Court was
asked to interpret this disclosure requirement. In Evans v. Eaton,46 the
Court found that the requirement demanded two things from inventors.
First, the inventor must “make known the manner of constructing the
machine (if the invention is of a machine), so as to enable artizans [sic]
to make and use it, and thus to give the public the full benefit of the
discovery, after the expiration of the patent.”47 Next, the inventor must
put the public in possession of what the party claims as his own invention, so as
to ascertain if he claims anything that is in common use, or is already known,
and to guard against prejudice or injury from the use of an invention which the
party may otherwise innocently suppose not to be patented. It is, therefore, for
the purpose of warning an innocent purchaser, or other person using a machine,
of his infringement of the patent; and at the same time, of taking from the
inventor the means of practising [sic] upon the credulity or the fears of other
persons, by pretending that his invention is more than what it really is, or
different from its ostensible objects, that the patentee is required to distinguish
his invention in his specification.48

44. Id. at 129.
45. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 2 Stat. 348, 349 (1793) (repealed 1836).
The Act required inventors to
deliver a written description of his invention, and of the manner of using, or
process of compounding, the same, in such full, clear, and exact terms, as to
distinguish the same from all other things before known, and to enable any
person, skilled in the art or science of which it is a branch, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make, compound, and use, the same. And in the
case of any machine, he shall fully explain the principle, and the several modes
in which he has contemplated the application of that principle or character by
which it may be distinguished from other inventions . . . .
Id.
46. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822) (finding a patent for an improved machine used
by the flour industry void for lack of written description).
47. Id. at 433–34.
48. Id. at 434. Ten years later, the Court revisited the subject. Grant v. Raymond,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218 (1832). The case concerned a patent for an improved method of
manufacturing hat bodies, with the defendants alleging the patent was invalid for a
written specification defect. Id. at 239. The Court indicated that the purpose of the
written description was communicating the invention to the public, and failure to
accurately do so would endanger both the inventor and the public—the public by
granting the inventor a monopoly over something he did not invent and the inventor by
providing the public with something he had not patented. Id. at 242. At the time both
Raymond and Eaton were decided, patent applications did not require claims. See infra
note 56 and accompanying text.
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Thus, in 1822, inventors were obliged to submit a disclosure that
fulfilled three requirements: enablement (“enable artizans [sic] to make
and use”), best mode (“give the public the full benefit of the discovery”),
and written description (“put the public in possession of what the party
claims as his own invention”). Even at this early stage, however, the Supreme
Court viewed the function of the written description requirement as one
mainly of limitation—“taking from the inventor the means of practising
[sic] upon the credulity or the fears of other persons, by pretending that
his invention is more than what it really is.” Though the written description
requirement, as currently applied, bears only facial resemblance to that
of the nineteenth century, it is certainly relevant that judicial
interpretation of the requirement’s purpose 200 years ago (as protecting
the public by requiring clarity in one’s disclosure) was mirrored by
today’s Federal Circuit. At least it was until July 2002.
In 1952 patent law was recodified in Title 35.49 Section 112, first
paragraph, describes the written description requirement:50
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth
the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.51

Thus, § 112 specifies the three disclosure hurdles all patent applicants
must cross—written description, enablement, and best mode.52
As a result of the judicial application of the written description
requirement to constrain patent boundaries, courts have required
precision in its terms. For example, in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United
States Plywood Corp.,53 the Second Circuit found that while the district
court’s application of the precision requirement was too stringent, the
written description itself must be precise enough to avoid discouraging
49. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2000).
50. Id. § 112.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. 258 F.2d 124 (1958). This case may set the standard for the most civilized
opening salvo ever launched in patent litigation:
“Dear Owen:
“While imitation is supposed to be the sincerest form of flattery, I must
confess to a different reaction when I learned that you are imitating Weldtex.
“As you know, Weldtex is covered by U.S. Patents which have been
recognized by the industry for more than thirteen years. Under the
circumstances, we will of course take vigorous action to protect our patent
rights and are turning the matter over to our counsel for appropriate action.
“Sincerely,
“Tony”
Id. at 127.
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enterprise and experimentation “by the creation of an area of uncertainty
as to the scope of the invention.”54
However, despite occasional judicial recognition, the teeth of the
written description requirement dulled during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, as the “public notice” aim of the requirement was
supplanted by the practice of “claiming” the patentable aspects of one’s
invention.55 Over time, applicants began to use the claims of the patent
application to provide public notice as to the boundaries of the patent.56
During this period, the written description requirement itself came to be
viewed as part of the enablement requirement, such that the two were
often seen functionally as a single entity. If the written description
adequately enabled one skilled in the art to practice the invention, it
would usually be found to fulfill the actual written description
requirement.57 This interpretation changed dramatically in In re Ruschig.58
2. The Modern Written Description Requirement
Ruschig concerned the appeal from a PTO rejection of a single
amended claim in a patent application.59 The PTO had rejected the claim60
based on the lack of support contained within the written description of
the application. Although the description named a class of compounds,
among which could be found the subject of the claim, it did not identify
the actual structure of the claimed compound.61 The appellants argued
that one skilled in the art could readily discern the claimed compound
from the written description, and the court agreed.62 The court, however,
went on to state that the written description requirement entailed more
than just enablement. The description must prove to one ordinarily
skilled in the art that the inventor possessed that which he claimed at the

54. Id. at 136.
55. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996).
56. See id. at 373, 379 (noting that claiming was first required by the Patent Act of 1870).
57. “The purpose of the [written] description requirement of this paragraph is to
state what is needed to fulfill the enablement criteria. These requirements may be viewed
separately, but they are intertwined.” Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int’l, Inc., 835 F.2d
1419, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
58. 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
59. Id. at 991.
60. Claim 13 recited, in relevant part, “N-(p-chlorobenzenesulfonyl)-N’propylurea.” Id. The claim also contained a structural depiction of the compound. Id.
61. Id. at 993.
62. Id. at 995.
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point in time he claimed it.63 Finding the specification at issue to lack
the specificity necessitated by § 112, the court held the claim invalid.64
Ruschig made the written description requirement viable after over a
century of near-dormancy. After Ruschig, amended claims65 would be
examined in light of the applicant’s written description to determine
whether the applicant possessed the claimed invention at the time of
filing.66 The judicial goal was preventing applicants from unfairly
broadening their patent rights by adding new material to an already
pending application. This decision also delineated a clear demarcation
between the requirements of enablement and written description, a
division the court would continue to support.67
Over the next thirty years the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(CCPA) and the Federal Circuit (which replaced the CCPA in 1982)68
would, for the most part, adhere to the written description guidelines
specified in Ruschig, using the initial written description as a net to
“filter” amended claims. If the initial written description failed to
encompass the amended claims, the court would usually find the
amended claims invalid.69 The written description requirement became
a valuable judicial tool used to limit claim amendments to that which the
inventor actually possessed as of the application filing date. Subject
matter claimed in subsequent amendments would not gain the advantage
of the earlier filing date if the new material was not covered by the
applicant’s initial disclosure.70 This practice of requiring amended
claims to fit within the initial disclosure is perhaps in tension with the
traditional patent law doctrine of “constructive” reduction to practice,71
63. Id. at 995–96.
64. Id.
65. Often during patent prosecution the claims with the patent application will be
modified as a result of the dialog between the PTO examiner and the patentee (or the
patentee’s attorney). STEPHEN ELIAS, PATENT, COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK 207 (3d ed.
1999).
66. Ruschig, 379 F.2d at 996.
67. “[I]t is possible for a specification to enable the practice of an invention . . .
and still not describe that invention.” In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 (C.C.P.A.
1971). “Although a specification that meets the written description requirement always
satisfies the enablement requirement, the converse is not always true.” In re Hunter, 59
F.3d 181 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
68. MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 6, § 7.10, at 121.
69. See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written
Description Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615,
633 (1998).
70. Id. at 635.
71. Reduction to practice refers to the point at which the inventor physically
produces the invention. MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 6, § 3.9, at 61. Constructive
reduction to practice is a legal presumption of actual reduction to practice on the filing
date. Robert A. Hodges, Comment, Black Box Biotech Inventions: When a “Mere Wish
or Plan” Should Be Considered an Adequate Description of the Invention, 17 GA. ST. U.
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whereby an inventor is assumed to have constructively reduced the
invention to practice by the date of filing the application. However, in
the arts termed “unpredictable” by the Federal Circuit (or the CCPA),72
such as chemistry and biotechnology, the court has used a more literal
reading of “reduction to practice,” often requiring an actual physical
reduction.73 In light of this, it is not surprising that the Federal Circuit
has also required in these unpredictable fields more conclusive documentary
proof of possession—a written description that actually proves the
inventor possessed what was claimed.
The judicial standards for fulfilling the written description
requirement in the unpredictable arts were further refined in Fiers,74
which concerned the DNA sequence coding75 for human fibroblast betainterferon.76 There, the Federal Circuit held that describing a claimed
cDNA sequence as a product of an isolation method77 did not satisfy the
written description requirement;78 what the court wanted was a
description of the DNA itself.79 Finally, in Regents of the University of
California v. Eli Lilly & Co.,80 the Federal Circuit found a claim for the
DNA encoding human insulin invalid because the application’s written
L. REV. 831, 843 (2001). The presumption arises when an applicant fulfills the
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 regardless of whether the applicant actually reduced the
invention to practice. Id.
72. “Where, as here, a claimed genus represents a diverse and relatively poorly
understood group of microorganisms, the required level of disclosure will be greater
than, for example, the disclosure of an invention involving a ‘predictable’ factor such as
a mechanical or electrical element.” In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
73. This physical reduction to practice is in contrast to the constructive reduction
to practice allowed in more predictable arts. See supra notes 71, 72.
74. Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
75. Genes consist of long stretches of both protein-coding regions (or exons) and
nonprotein-coding regions (or introns). ROTHWELL, supra note 8, at 293. Cellular
mechanisms excise the introns of the coding (or sense) strand before the DNA is
transcribed into RNA. Id. The resulting RNA can be converted in vitro into “cDNA,”
which represents the protein-coding regions of the gene in a single unbroken sequence.
Id. at 499.
76. Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1166.
77. Id. at 1170. Fiers had described the sequence in terms of a method for its
isolation using reverse transcription, converting RNA to DNA. Id. This practice
requires the use of enzymes, called reverse-transcriptases, present in certain viruses and
retroviruses and other nonhuman organisms. ROTHWELL, supra note 8, at 399.
78. Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1170, 1172. Fiers is another example of the difference
between enablement and written description. While the description adequately taught
one of ordinary skill in the art how to practice the invention, it did not adequately
describe the claimed DNA sequence.
79. Id. at 1170.
80. 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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description contained only a description of the protein the cDNA coded
for, as well as a method for isolating the human cDNA.81 Quoting Fiers,
the court stated that adequate written descriptions of DNA sequences
require “a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical
name, or physical properties.”82 The court’s decision was striking in
light of the fact that the University of California had already cloned the
rat insulin gene, and, to a person of ordinary skill in the art, this fact
alone would probably indicate possession of the human gene also.83 In
addition, Lilly is of importance for the court’s employment of the written
description filter through which the original claims must pass. This was
not a case of an inventor attempting to add claims under an earlier
application, thereby gaining the benefit of the earlier filing date, but
rather an apparent Federal Circuit intent to up the ante as far as the
written description doctrine was concerned. Further, as the Federal
Circuit was obviously aware of the importance of this issue, it seems
unlikely that the court reached its decision without careful consideration.
Taken as a whole, these cases trace a clear arc in Federal Circuit
jurisprudence, tightening the written description requirement such that,
to claim a DNA sequence, one must describe the sequence precisely.
Not only must inventors demonstrate possession, they must also
demonstrate that they knew what they possessed by accurately and
precisely describing the sequence with, in the words of the Lilly court, “a
kind of specificity usually achieved by means of the recitation of the
sequence of nucleotides that make up the cDNA.”84 Clearly, in the eyes
of the Federal Circuit, functional descriptions85 (what something does
rather than what something is) were not sufficient to surmount this
obstacle. Just as clearly, this application of the written description
requirement is an appropriate one for several reasons: First and
foremost, this is our genetic heritage, not a canine watch86 or a landing

81. Id. at 1567.
82. Id. at 1566 (quoting Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171).
83. Id. at 1567. The rat and human insulin genes are highly homologous (very
similar in sequence), so one of ordinary skill in the art might reasonably feel that
possession of one indicated possession of the other. See, e.g., European Patent Office,
Trilateral Project 24.1, at http://www.european-patent-office.org/tws/sr-3-b33.htm (last
visited Apr. 5, 2003).
84. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1569.
85. [A] functional description of DNA does not indicate which DNA has been
invented. And simply acknowledging the presence of a DNA that serves a
particular function, whose existence has been postulated since, perhaps,
Mendel, plus a general process for finding it, is not a description of the DNA.
It is a research plan at best, and does not show “possession” of any invention.
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
86. U.S. Patent No. 5,023,850 (issued June 11, 1991).
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light on a toilet.87 In such an important field, courts should be wary of
validating overly broad or unclear patents,88 as the repercussions of such
acts will be as far-reaching as they are unpredictable. Furthermore, this
danger is heightened in the emerging genomics, pharmaceutical, and
biotechnology industries, where technology is advancing at staggering
rates, and huge amounts of “upstream” research are required to produce
beneficial products downstream. As such, the modern reemphasis on the
written description requirement in this setting is both appropriate
considering the subject matter and necessary with regard to the relative
immaturity of current DNA technology.89 Taken together, Ruschig,
Fiers, and Lilly indicate a two-part test for gauging satisfaction of the
written description requirement. First, does the written description
adequately convey to one ordinarily skilled in the art that the inventor
possessed the claimed invention? Second, does the written description
adequately convey to one ordinarily skilled in the art that the inventor
knew exactly90 what she had invented? For several years, Federal
Circuit jurisprudence required the written description for DNA
sequences to pass this bright-line test, but the Enzo decision signified a
sea change in the court’s doctrinal approach.
III. ENZO BIOCHEM, INC. V. GEN-PROBE INC.91
Enzo Biochem92 held a patent for nucleic acid probes93 used in
87. U.S. Patent No. 5,263,209 (issued Nov. 23, 1993).
88. Overly broad and unclear patents often coincide. When the written description
is inadequate, it is difficult for a court to accurately discern the appropriate patent boundaries.
89. Wilkins, Watson, and Crick are credited with discovering DNA’s double-helix
structure in the early 1950s, ROTHWELL, supra note 8, at 218–19, but recombinant DNA
techniques were not developed until the 1970s. See generally Stanley N. Cohen et al.,
Construction of Biologically Functional Bacterial Plasmids In Vitro, 70 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. U.S. 3240 (1973).
90. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
91. 285 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2002), vacated by 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
92. Enzo Biochem, founded in 1976, focuses on “harnessing genetic processes to
develop research tools, diagnostics and therapeutics and provides reference laboratory
services to the medical community.” Enzo Biochem, Inc., About Enzo Biochem, Inc., at
http://www.enzobio.com/corp_about.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2003). The company is
publicly owned with a market capitalization of $377.2 million as of March 18, 2003 and
has 205 employees. Yahoo! Finance, Enzo Biochem, at http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=
ENZ&d=t (last visited Apr. 5, 2003).
93. Enzo was the assignee of U.S. Patent No. 4,900,659. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 285
F.3d at 1015. Nucleic acid probes are short, labeled (with radioactive or luminescent
markers) sequences of DNA or RNA that can bind with complementary stretches of
nucleic acid. They are used to detect the presence of a specific gene within a DNA
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determining the presence of the bacteria that causes gonorrhea.94 The
beauty of Enzo’s probes was their preferential binding to the DNA of the
bacteria that cause gonorrhea over the DNA of the bacteria that cause
meningitis.95 The inventors had filed their application and deposited
these probes as plasmids96 within E. coli97 host bacteria with the
American Type Culture Collection (ATCC).98
A. The District Court Decision
Enzo sued Gen-Probe for infringement of their ‘659 patent, and the
defendants responded with a motion for summary judgment, alleging the
written description for ‘659 was inadequate, as Enzo did not describe the
probes in terms of their specific DNA sequence,99 but rather by reference
to the probes’ ability to preferentially bind N. gonorrhoeae DNA over
that of N. meningitidis (a functional description).100 The written
description also referenced the ATCC deposit.101 The District Court
agreed with Gen-Probe,102 stating that a functional description of the
material was not sufficient to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112.
In light of Federal Circuit precedent, the district court’s decision
would seem correct. The inventors had described the claimed DNA
sample and are valuable as both research and diagnostic tools. ROTHWELL, supra note 8,
at 502–03.
94. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 285 F.3d at 1015.
95. Id. at 1015–16. Preferential binding (or hybridization) typically means that a
probe will bind to a given DNA sequence more tightly than to an other DNA sequence,
or under conditions more stringent (less conducive to binding) than those under which
the probe will bind to another sequence. See, e.g., J. SAMBROOK ET AL., 2 MOLECULAR
CLONING: A LABORATORY MANUAL 11.45–11.49 (Nina Irwin et al. eds, 2d ed. 1989).
For example, changing the ionic strength of the reaction conditions can make probes less
likely to bind to a DNA sequence. Id. Therefore, if a probe does in fact bind to a
sequence under such conditions, it is assumed that the probe is more specific for that
sequence than a probe that will only bind to the particular sequence under less stringent
conditions. Id. The end result is that Enzo’s probe bound the Neisseria gonorrhoeae
DNA more effectively than it bound the DNA of Neisseria meningitidis. Enzo Biochem,
Inc., 285 F.3d at 1015–16. This allowed Enzo to test for gonorrhea without the presence
of N. meningitidis causing a “false positive” result, which had frustrated previous
attempts. Id.
96. A plasmid is a replicating sequence of DNA that exists apart from the host’s
(usually a bacterium) genome. DNA sequences inserted into plasmids are replicated by
the host. ROTHWELL, supra note 8, at 359–60.
97. E. coli is a commonly used bacterium for “hosting” plasmids. Id. at 362.
98. The ATCC is a nonprofit bioresource center that serves, among other things, as
a repository for biological samples. See American Type Culture Collection, About
ATCC, at http://www.atcc.org/About/AboutATCC.cfm (last visited Apr. 5, 2003). The
ATCC is not affiliated with the U.S. Government. Id.
99. See U.S. Patent No. 4,900,659 (issued Feb. 13, 1990).
100. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 285 F.3d at 1020.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1015.
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functionally103 in their initial written description without including actual
sequence data; clearly, under Ruschig, Fiers, and Lilly, such practice was
not sufficient to satisfy § 112 in the context of DNA sequence patents.
Indeed, the decision was deemed appropriate by the Federal Circuit
when the case reached the court on appeal.104
B. The First Federal Circuit Decision
On appeal, Enzo presented several arguments. First, a genuine issue
of fact existed as to the adequacy of the patent’s specification.105
Second, Enzo asserted the district court erred by granting summary
judgment based entirely on the written description.106 Next, Enzo argued
that its description of the binding characteristics of the probes satisfied107
the PTO guidelines.108 Further, Enzo argued that Lilly did not apply because
Enzo had in fact reduced the invention to practice and publicly deposited
the probes, thereby demonstrating possession.109 The court was unimpressed,
stating, “We reject Enzo’s characterization of the hybridization as a distinctive
‘chemical property’ of the claimed sequences.”110 The court went on to
state that the PTO guidelines were not binding upon it, and, at any rate,
the hybridization data set out in the written description was the only
characteristic “purportedly describing the claimed nucleotide sequences.”111
The court then described the written description requirement as reflecting
the “quid pro quo of our patent system, in which an inventor is only
103. U.S. Patent No. 4,900,659. The inventors’ description stated the hybridization
characteristics of the probes, but lacked sequence data. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 285 F.3d at
1020.
104. Id. at 1015.
105. Id. at 1017.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶
1, “Written Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099 (Jan. 5, 2001) (codified at 37
C.F.R. § 1.56 (2002)).
109. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 285 F.3d at 1017.
110. Id. at 1018. In fairness to the appellants, the PTO examination guidelines do
contain the following: “An applicant may also show that an invention is complete by
disclosure of sufficiently detailed, relevant identifying characteristics . . . i.e., complete
or partial structure, . . . functional characteristics when coupled with a known or
disclosed correlation between function and structure, or some combination of such
characteristics.” Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C.
112, ¶ 1, “Written Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1106.
111. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 285 F.3d at 1019. “Stated another way, Enzo claimed
anything that works, without defining what works.” Id. at 1020.

919

GIBSON.DOC

9/17/2019 11:23 AM

entitled to claim subject matter that is adequately described to the
public,”112 an apparent return to the public notice aspect of the written
description requirement that had waned when claims came to serve that
purpose. The court then turned its attention to the public deposit.
Enzo had argued that public deposit demonstrated its possession of the
invention.113 The Federal Circuit did not disagree, but rather stated that
possession itself, while necessary, was not sufficient.114 The inventor
must also adequately describe the invention. Indeed, the court termed
adequate identification of what one has invented the “most basic
requirement of the patent law.”115 Continuing, the court indicated that
public deposit alone does not ipso facto satisfy the requirements of §
112, first paragraph.116
This first Federal Circuit Enzo decision was not unanimous. In a
spirited dissent, Judge Dyk pointed out that at the time the patent was
filed (1986), sequencing the DNA would have taken, according to Enzo,
3000 scientists an entire month to complete.117 Judge Dyk felt that
patent law required no such “Herculean effort” when one ordinarily
skilled in the art would understand the invention based on the written
description filed by the applicants.118 Judge Dyk may be right—perhaps
no such Herculean effort is supportable by either patent law or public
policy, but, on the other hand, Title 35 makes no special dispensations
for cases where the effort required to meet the statutory requirements for
patentability is great. In addition, it is probably appropriate that DNA
sequence patents are subject to more stringent requirements, for the two
reasons previously stated—low written description standards119 for DNA
sequence patents cause harm by creating uncertainty as to the extent of a
patent holder’s rights as well as by increasing transaction costs.120
112. Id. at 1019.
113. Id. at 1020 (citing Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
Enzo argued that the written description requirement was a mere possession requirement.
Id. at 1017. The court did not agree. Id.
114. Id. at 1020–21.
115. Id. at 1021.
116. Id. at 1022.
117. Id. at 1026 n.2 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
118. Id.
119. This is so regardless of which aspect (novelty, obviousness, utility, etc.) of
patentability the standards concern.
120. Of course, patents themselves, regardless of the standards used to award them,
raise transaction costs, because patents limit the ability of others to use the patented
technology. The patent holder may charge whatever the market will bear for the right to
use the patented invention, and if the cost is too high, further development of the
technology may be chilled. Even if the holder charges nothing to use the technology, it
would be unwise to proceed without contracts and license agreements, all of which take
time, and more often than not, money also. However, this is one of the trade-offs
inherent in our system, a system that has, for the most part, worked well for the last 200
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Response to the decision was underwhelming. Many felt that the
Federal Circuit’s general characterization of hybridization as a functional
property to be shortsighted,121 as it effectively threatened the validity of
the claims of many previously issued patents.122 Also, to some, it
appeared that the Federal Circuit was disregarding PTO practices in an
area where at least some degree of deference was in order.123
C. The Second Federal Circuit Decision
Unhappy with their first Federal Circuit result, Enzo petitioned for and
was granted a rehearing.124 Once again, Judges Lourie, Dyk, and Prost
considered the case, which was, by this time, generating an impressive
amount of interest from the intellectual property community, triggering
amicus curiae briefs from Fish & Richardson P.C. as well as the
Department of Justice.125 Upon further consideration the court found
Enzo’s arguments more persuasive126 and vacated its prior decision. The
Federal Circuit reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment
and remanded the case as to certain genus claims.127 As to the written
description issue, the court held that “reference in the specification to a
deposit in a public depository, which makes its contents accessible to the
public when it is not otherwise available in written form, constitutes an
adequate description of the deposited material sufficient to comply with
plus years. The problem lies in the structure of the industry. As more companies work
in basic research fields and seek to create value by patenting their discoveries, basic
research itself will become property more and more.
121. Kevin Takeuchi, The Federal Circuit Raises the Bar for Written Description of
Genetic Materials, CASRIP NEWSL., Spring–Summer 2002, at 1–2, at http://www.law.
washington.edu/casrip.
122. A similar “reliance” issue previously presented itself to the Federal Circuit.
See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998). In State Street, the court distinguished earlier cases that found business methods
unpatentable due merely to the subject matter of the application. Id. at 1377. However,
the PTO had already allowed business method patents before State Street was decided,
perhaps suggesting that the PTO feels no more bound by the Federal Circuit than the
Federal Circuit does by the PTO.
123. Takeuchi, supra note 121, at 2.
124. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002), reh’g
denied en banc, 323 F.3d 956.
125. Id. at 1319–20 & n.1.
126. Id. at 1330. The court’s description of Enzo’s position suggests that Enzo’s
argument did not change between the first and second Federal Circuit proceedings.
Compare Enzo Biochem, Inc., 296 F.3d at 1323, with Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe
Inc., 285 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2002), vacated by 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
127. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 296 F.3d at 1330.
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the written description requirement of § 112, ¶ 1.”128 In this second
decision the Federal Circuit seemed to give more weight to the PTO
guidelines,129 stating, “[U]nder the Guidelines, the written description
requirement would be met for all of the claims of the ‘659 patent if the
functional characteristic of preferential binding to N. gonorrhoeae over
N. meningitidis were coupled with a disclosed correlation between that
function and a structure that is sufficiently known or disclosed.”130
Further, the court indicated it would adopt PTO guidelines for
determining written description sufficiency.131 Thus, the Federal Circuit
found Enzo’s DNA deposits combined with its functional descriptions of
the probes to meet the requirements of § 112, first paragraph.132
Read narrowly, the decision could indicate merely that the Federal
Circuit will allow written descriptions that combine public deposit with a
functional description if a known or disclosed correlation between
structure and function exists. Even so, this standard is clearly a step back
from Lilly, which, while never explicitly requiring an inventor to provide
the exact sequence of any claimed DNA, indicated that in the case of
DNA patents a “particular” description was required.133 Further, the
Enzo decision seems to indicate that a public deposit can make up for a
less precise written description in cases where it is difficult to provide
the exact structure of the claimed material. It is in precisely those cases,
however, where courts should refrain from relaxing patentability
standards. Whether a reflection upon the particular industry, or upon the
particular inventor, inability to accurately describe one’s invention
should not be excused or rewarded—if an invention cannot be described
with precision, then perhaps it is premature to grant a monopoly on that
invention.

128. Id. at 1325.
129. Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. 112,
¶ 1, “Written Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099 (Jan. 5, 2001).
130. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 296 F.3d at 1324–25.
131. Id. at 1325. The court wrote, “We are persuaded by the Guidelines on this
point and adopt the PTO’s applicable standard for determining compliance with the
written description requirement.” Id.
132. Id.
133. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir.
1997). “An adequate written description of a DNA, such as the cDNA of the
recombinant plasmids and microorganisms of the ‘525 patent, ‘requires a precise
definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties,’ not a
mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed chemical invention.” Id. (quoting Fiers v.
Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
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IV. THE EFFECTS OF ENZO
The Federal Circuit’s final Enzo decision134 will have both immediate
and long range impact. In the short term, the court’s relaxation of the
written description standards for DNA patentability will result in lower
quality patents with undefined limits that will deter inventors as well as
investors. These reduced standards will also increase the role of the
court system in determining the boundaries of DNA sequence patents as
litigation over patent infringement increases.135 In addition, these lower
patentability standards will increase the burden on an already strained
PTO by creating an ever growing mass of unsearchable, poorly
described prior art,136 as well as by triggering a likely increase in DNA
patent applications.137 Over the long-term, these patents on basic
research may create a tragedy of the anticommons,138 with patents on
DNA sequences “locking up” information and techniques and driving
transaction costs and thus consumer expenses higher. Even more
threatening, DNA sequences patents may prevent the drug development
that depends on this basic research. The downstream result of the
development may be rendered obvious, and thus unpatentable, by the
sequence patent. Few pharmaceutical companies will be willing to
invest the $800 million139 on the research and development (R&D)
134. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 296 F.3d 1316.
135. It seems likely that patent litigation will increase as the level of uncertainty
surrounding any given patent rises. At the very least, the threat of strategic litigation by
large, well-funded life science industry corporations should increase because these
corporations are better equipped to finance protracted infringement suits. More
uncertainty equates to more risk for the litigants, and larger companies are typically
better suited to assume such risk.
136. PTO examiners already face a daunting task in determining the relevant prior
art for any given patent application. Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better
Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 767 (2002). “From these insights, it is clear
that information regarding the relevant prior art for any patent application is most likely
to be known only to the patentee and his competitors.” Id.
137. Michael J. Meurer, Business Method Patents and Patent Floods, 8 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 309, 309–10 (2002). Meurer uses the term “patent flood” to describe the
resulting increase in business method patent applications following the Federal Circuit’s
decision in State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368
(1998) (upholding the patentability of business methods). In the case of DNA sequence
patents, it is likely that the lowering of the written description requirements will trigger a
similar increase.
138. See Hardin, supra note 30, at 1243–44.
139. This figure represents dollars in 2000, according to a study of information
obtained from research-based drug companies. Tufts Center for the Study of Drug
Development, News & Events (Nov. 30, 2001), at http://csdd.tufts.edu/NewsEvents/
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necessary to put a new drug on the market if patent protection is
unavailable, as generic drug development is considerably less expensive
than new drug development. While the generic manufacturer can price
the drug based on its manufacturing and marketing expenses, the
original developer must attempt to recoup its entire R&D costs.140
A. The Short Term Impact of Enzo: Patent Uncertainty
Allowing public deposit of DNA sequences to satisfy the written
description requirement will make it easier to patent DNA sequences.
Unfortunately, this boon to patentees comes at the expense of the public
who must attempt to discern the limits of the patented invention. For
DNA sequence patents this boundary mapping often means sequencing
the sample oneself.141 While not as onerous a chore today as it was ten
years ago,142 the responsibility for sequencing the sample should rest
with the holder of the patent, rather than with the public.143 As a result
of the judicial shifting of the description responsibility to noninventors,
patent applicants can circumvent the traditional disclosure demands of
the patent system while still gaining the advantage that patents have
always provided: a monopoly in the manufacture, use, and sale of the
RecentNews.asp?newsid=6. The same R&D costs were $231 million in 1987, but
inflation alone cannot account for the increase as this figure is only the equivalent of
$318 million in 2000 when inflation is taken into account. Id. The rising cost has been
attributed to several factors including spiraling R&D costs as well as the rapidly
increasing expense of clinical trials. Id.
140. However, the developer cannot use its patents to impede the development of a
competitor’s generic.
Recently, the Federal Trade Commission launched an
investigation to determine whether Elan Corporation (an Irish pharmaceutical company)
had used its patents to “block” generic competitors by using “multiple patents to extend
their monopolies over medicines, thereby preventing less expensive generics from
reaching the market.” Jed Seltzer, U.S. Regulators Look Closely at Elan’s Practices,
SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Mar. 15, 2003, at C1.
141. DNA sequencing requires time, money, trained personnel, and access to
laboratory equipment. Even if the sequencing itself is contracted out, the DNA sample
must be generated and purified.
142. Ten years ago sequencing a DNA sample usually involved radioactivity, in the
form of Sulphur-35, high voltage to run the sequencing gel, working in the dark so as not
to expose the photographic film, and patience over the week to ten days the film would
be exposed to the gel. Marcus Grompe et al., Recombinant DNA and Genetic
Techniques, in PRINCIPLES OF MOLECULAR MEDICINE 9 (J.L. Jameson ed. 1998),
available at http://www.humanapress.com/pdfs/9.pdf. Today, for a reasonable fee any
of a number of labs will sequence your DNA sample in a matter of days. See Randall
Parker, On the Declining Costs of DNA Sequencing, (explaining that DNA sequencing
costs have drastically declined), at http://www.futurepundit.com/archives/001802.html
(Nov. 19, 2003); see also Cleveland Genomics, DNA Sequencing Services, (stating that
the turnaround time for DNA sequencing is generally two to three days), at
http://www.clevelandgenomics.com (last visited April 20, 2004).
143. See Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 434 (1822) (finding a patent for
an improved machine used by the flour industry void for a written description defect).
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patented item. Further, once the patent is issued, the inventor benefits
from the presumption of validity144 that all patents carry. Overall, it
would seem that these unclear, low quality patents benefit the inventor
much more so than the public, and in fact, these patents may directly
harm several groups in the short-term.
1. The Impact on Inventors
Low quality DNA sequence patents resulting from this relaxed written
description standard will immediately affect life science industry
inventors. In the wake of Enzo they will face the daunting task of
having to determine on their own the limits of the patents they might
brush up against in their research. For example, any company wishing
to market a product similar to Enzo’s probes faces a Hobbesian choice of
either determining the DNA sequence of Enzo’s probes or risking a
crippling infringement suit.
Suppose a company named STD-Away wants to develop a treatment
for gonorrhea, the disease that Enzo’s probes could identify, using
antisense technology.145 STD-Away is aware that Enzo has a patent on
certain probes that preferentially bind to the genome of the bacteria that
causes gonorrhea. They know they will have to be careful of infringing,
but therein lies the problem. STD-Away has no way of knowing the
exact sequence of Enzo’s probes,146 so they have no way of designing
around them. It is unlikely that STD-Away will continue with its project
in the informational vacuum created by Enzo’s patent. Biotech companies,
especially young ones, are subject to brutal selective pressure, and to run
144. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
145. Antisense technology is a method of using the complementary binding
capability of DNA (and RNA) to inhibit protein production and thus treat disease. Isis
Pharmaceuticals, Basic Science, at http://www.isispharm.com/basic_sci.html (last visited
Nov. 2, 2003). Antisense technology works by interrupting the translation of DNA into
protein. Id. Normally, DNA is composed of two strands, the coding (or sense) strand
and noncoding (or antisense) strand. Id. To make proteins, the sense strand is
transcribed into messenger RNA (mRNA) by cellular enzymes that build mRNA
molecules in the same manner other enzymes build DNA molecules. Id. As are matched
with Us (for uracil, replacing thymine), and Gs are matched with Cs, with the antisense
strand serving as the template. Id. Thus, the mRNA is a copy of the sense DNA strand
with the Ts replaced with Us. Id. Antisense drugs are short sequences of DNA that code
for mRNAs capable of binding to the sense mRNA and prevent it from forming a
template for protein production. Id.
146. STD-Away could sequence the probes themselves, but up until Enzo, § 112’s
disclosure requirements imposed that duty upon the patentee.
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such a risk would be foolhardy. Thus, if STD-Away wants to proceed,
they will have to sequence Enzo’s probes themselves, completing a task
the patentee should have been obliged to accomplish in exchange for
exclusionary patent rights. Alternatively, they may abandon their
project out of reluctance to expend time and capital in a market another
company might have already cornered.
In addition to the advantage of relaxed disclosure standards that now
apply when a patent applicant makes an ATCC deposit, once the patent
is granted, the holder may arrange to be notified by the ATCC whenever
the deposited sample is accessed.147 Thus, a patentee who publicly
deposits a DNA sequence is provided a convenient early warning device
that can identify potential threats before they impact the patentee’s
market share.
2. The Impact on Investors
Investors may face a similar obstacle in not being able to determine
what is truly new because they cannot determine what is truly old. For
example, in the typical industry scenario, venture capitalists148
extensively research companies they are considering for investment. As
the worth and potential of young biotechnology companies is often
measured by assessing their patent portfolios,149 venture capitalists
engage patent attorneys to draft opinion letters regarding the target150
company’s patents or conversely the patents belonging to the target
company’s competitors. These opinion letters can easily run into the
tens of thousands of dollars,151 but are an invaluable aid in determining
the advisability of funding a company.152 A major aspect of these letters
147. Interview with Dan Altman, Partner, Knobbe, Martens, Olson & Bear, in San
Diego, Cal. (Feb. 6, 2003).
148. Venture capital firms are usually private partnerships or closely held
corporations that provide funding for, among other things, smaller companies at their
early stage of development. National Venture Capital Association, The Venture Capital
Industry: An Overview, at http://www.nvca.org/def.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2003).
Venture capital firms often focus on “high-tech” companies at the stage before an initial
private offering (IPO). Id. Almost 3000 venture capital-funded companies have
conducted IPOs in the last twenty-five years. Id.
149. Seminar Speaker Summary, Eileen McMahon: Patents and Biotech: An
Overview of the Leading Issues, available at http://www.erin.utoronto.ca/mbiotech/
page/astrazen/em.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2003). “A company’s IP is one of the major
criteria evaluated by investors.” Id.
150. “Target company” refers to the company of interest (the investment candidate).
151. Interview with Sheila R. Gibson, Associate Attorney, Knobbe, Martens, Olson
& Bear, in San Diego, Cal. (Feb. 8, 2003).
152. Opinion letters can also serve as a shield from some damage awards in the
event of an infringement suit. Id. Following a course of action that was previously
examined by an attorney eases the threat of multiplied (treble in the case of willful patent
infringement) damages. Id.
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is mapping the limits of patent coverage in order to avoid infringement.
It strains credulity to imagine that Enzo will aid in this task, as the
decision has lessened the disclosure requirements patent applicants face.
It will of course still be possible for the limits of these patents to be
determined, but post-Enzo, this responsibility is placed on parties who
have no exclusionary rights to the patented device. This starkly contrasts
with the historical practice of demanding informative disclosure in
return for the monopoly rights that accompany all patents.153 This added
burden on patent attorneys will translate into higher costs for their
customers. When the costs of due diligence on the part of venture
capitalists begin to increase as a result of Enzo’s relaxed disclosure
standards, it is quite possible that investment capital will be diverted
from those fledgling companies whose courses track too closely to
patents with written descriptions referring to public deposits in lieu of
detailed descriptions. Over time, venture capitalists may come to view
patents like that of Enzo’s in the same way ancient mapmakers viewed
the far edges of the known world—“here there be monsters.”
Even if venture capitalists are not dissuaded from investing as a result
of unclear DNA sequence patents, they will probably require more in
return from young life science companies to offset their increased risk.
Whether in the form of higher interest rates or larger equity positions,
the increased demands of venture capitalists could in turn increase the
selective pressure154 upon these young companies.155 Though selective
pressure is the driving force behind competition, and competition
generally benefits consumers, excess selective pressure may eliminate
young companies prematurely. As the number of companies competing
in a market declines, market share, and thus power, becomes
153. The historical quid pro quo. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 285
F.3d 1013, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2002), vacated by 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
154. “Selective pressure” describes the “pressure placed by a selective agent upon
certain individuals within the population that results in the change of allele frequencies
in the next generation.” Selective Pressure, at http://www.webref.org/anthropology/s/
selective_pressure.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2003). The term is most often used to
describe the force exerted by the environment upon living organisms that produces the
changes we collectively term “evolution.” Id. Here, the term is used to describe the
force exerted upon young life science companies by the marketplace, such as availability
of investment capital.
155. As stated, when venture capitalist firms make riskier investments they may
also demand more control of the company. As these firms obviously expect to earn
returns on their investments, they may show less patience with technology and product
development and be more inclined to pull their support from young companies whose
books do not rapidly ascend from red ink to black.
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concentrated in the hands of the “winners.” While this result can be
wonderful for successful competitors, consumers will often end up
paying higher prices as a result of a decrease in market competitors. For
example, consider the price of a hot dog at a major league stadium.
Because the number of hot dog vendors is contractually limited,156 the
overall level of competition is lowered. Vendors can charge a higher
price for a hot dog inside the stadium than they could outside, where one
could buy from any number of sources. As the number of competitors in
the market is limited, vendors do not need to compete as hard as they
would in a market teeming with hot dog suppliers, such as any place not
within the confines of a major league ballpark. Fledgling biotechnology
companies are not selling hot dogs, but regardless of the particular
market involved, consumers generally benefit from competition between
providers of goods. On the other hand, as the number of providers in an
active market decreases,157 consumers have less leverage with which to
influence those providers. The threat of taking one’s business elsewhere
has little effect when there is no “elsewhere” to take it. Enzo may
further this scenario by deterring venture capitalist investment in young
life science companies as a result of the uncertainty caused by judicially
relaxed written description standards. Alternatively, the same end result
may arise as a consequence of Enzo by causing venture capitalists to
demand increased concessions (to offset the increased risks of unclear
DNA sequence patents) from young life science companies in need of
capital; these increased concessions could make the young company
more susceptible to the vagaries of the market, as well as cede more
control of the company to venture capitalists than was the norm a few
years ago. In either case, Enzo may make it harder for these young
156. This is not to imply any sort of conspiracy in the nation’s stadiums, and there
may be perfectly valid reasons why many stadiums have a single hot dog vendor (with
multiple outlets, of course). In fact, the reason for the limitation on the number of
vendors is often irrelevant. Whether it is a result of limited space, in the interest of
efficiency, or through the evil intent of the worldwide hot dog cartel, most limitations on
competition among providers of goods and services will result in increased costs to the
consumer. For more information on hot dogs at the major league level, see Chris
Corbellini, 2001: A Baseball Odyssey, at http://www.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/
events/mlb_odyssey_story.jsp?type=notes&day=story_0906 (last visited Apr. 5, 2003),
for one man’s opinion on the best dogs in the majors.
157. This is true as long as the market does not crash. Assume ten companies each
maintain a ten percent market share, and through competition the number of companies
decreases to five, the market shares of at least some of the five companies will
necessarily increase. Eventually, as the number of competitors falls, the amount of
selective pressure the customer can apply through purchase decisions decreases because
her choices decrease along with the number of players in the particular market. Ever
wonder why there is no “value menu” at the fast food outlets inside major league
stadiums? There is none because baseball fans do not have the leverage to force the
supplier to provide one.
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companies to amass capital sufficient to withstand the Darwinian
pressures of the modern marketplace. Should that happen, medical and
scientific progress may slow as fewer companies pursue the promise of
breakthrough DNA technologies.158
3. The Impact on the Judicial System
The federal court system will also feel the impact of Enzo. The
disclosure regime thereby enabled could very well result in increased
patent litigation for the simple reason that, in the U.S. system, courts are
the final arbiters of patent claims. As such, when patents blur at the
margins, courts will increasingly be called upon to determine the exact
scope of a given claim.
The judicial difficulty with a relaxed written description standard will
most likely arise in the infringement context. Typically, courts analyze
infringement using a two-step process.159 First, the court compares the
allegedly infringing item with the claims of the patent.160 If the claims
“read on” the infringing device, there is infringement unless the
nonpatented device does not “do the same work, in substantially the
same way, and accomplish substantially the same result.”161 Barring
literal infringement, a device might still infringe by the doctrine of
equivalents.162 By this doctrine, a device will be found infringing if it
158. This view of the effects of marketplace competition is not the only one.
Economist Joseph Schumpeter has written extensively on the advantages of monopolies
in certain risky fields, especially in the area of innovation, because companies with
monopolistic positions can better realize (because of the lack of competition) the rewards
such risk can create. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND
DEMOCRACY 87 (Harper Torchbooks 1976) (1942). In the patent context, the work of
Edmund Kitch has followed a similar arc, recommending broad patents on basic research
as incentive for further development of the patented device. See Edmund W. Kitch, The
Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276 (1977).
159. See, e.g., Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 428 (Ct. Cl.
1967).
160. Id.
161. Dominion Magnesium Ltd. v. United States, 320 F.2d 388, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
This requirement exists because “the law is to benefit the inventor’s genius and not the
scrivener’s talents.” Autogiro Co. of Am., 384 F.2d at 399.
162. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 606 (1950).
“One who seeks to pirate an invention, like one who seeks to pirate a copyrighted book
or play, may be expected to introduce minor variations to conceal and shelter the piracy.
Outright and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of infringement.” Id. at
607. The doctrine of equivalents seeks to limit this loophole by preventing competitors
from marketing functionally equivalent (though not identical) versions of the patented
device. Id. at 608.
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performs the same function in the same way with the same result.163
Thus, because both literal infringement and infringement by the doctrine
of equivalents involve a test of what function a device performs, in what
way the device performs, and the end result achieved, anything that blurs
this examination will make patent infringement issues even more
problematic for courts. Patents that only satisfy the relaxed written
description requirements indicated by Enzo might present problems in
the “way the device performs” aspect of the infringement examination,
because it will at times be difficult to determine the exact mechanism of
a device’s operation when the written description does not precisely
describe the device. For DNA sequence patents, this issue could arise in
various ways. To refer to an earlier example, if STD-Away continues
their work and eventually markets an antisense gonorrhea drug, Enzo
will almost certainly bring an infringement suit, because for all Enzo
knows, STD-Away is infringing. By satisfying the written description
requirement through a public deposit, Enzo was never forced to
determine the exact structure of its sequence, so neither they, STDAway, or the district court hearing the case will know the “way” in
which the invention works.164 As murky as the described situation
would be, imagine if STD-Away had, like Enzo, made a public deposit
to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112. Then, the court would have to determine the
sequences of both Enzo’s and STD-Away’s inventions before they could
even begin their infringement analysis. Thus, public deposits could
impose upon courts the duty to map DNA sequence patent limits,
thereby increasing both the temporal as well as monetary burdens of
infringement suits.165
If courts should steer away from these sorts of determinations, unclear
patents could still make patent litigation more uncertain166 by turning
infringement suits into contests between expert witnesses asserting that
163. Id. (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
164. Of course, on a superficial level, the way Enzo’s probes work is by binding to
DNA, but the legal analysis goes beyond that. In the case of DNA sequences, the “way”
aspect of the infringement analysis would presumably require determination of exactly
where on the bacteria’s genome the probes bind, and this determination is difficult, if not
impossible, to make without knowing the sequence of the probes. See supra note 94 and
accompanying text.
165. As stated, time (in the sense of a company racing to market a product) and
money (with which to finance the race) can both operate as selective pressure. This makes
litigation an even more attractive option for larger companies who are better able to cope
with extended (and expensive) patent contests. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
166. Infringement suits are notoriously unpredictable anyway because accused
infringers have a wide array of defenses, including proving either that no infringement
occurred or that the original patent was invalid because of failure to meet any of the
guidelines specified in Title 35, such as utility, novelty, or nonobviousness. See 35
U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2000).
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the device in question does or does not perform in a certain manner.
Further, as infringement is a question of fact,167 many patent decisions
will be only narrowly applicable, with little precedential value. Finally,
this increase in uncertainty as to the direction courts may take could
make it easier for larger firms to employ their patents strategically168 by
bullying smaller firms with the threat of expensive infringement suits.
For example, Bristol-Myers, the world’s fifth-largest pharmaceutical
company, recently settled antitrust charges brought by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) alleging the company had misused patent law to
block generic competitors. According to FTC allegations, for over a
decade, Bristol-Myers had filed “baseless” infringement suits to preserve
its own monopoly position and frivolously listed new patents to delay
FDA approval of competitors’ generic versions of the company’s
drugs.169
In light of the uncertainty Enzo will engender, it seems likely that the
threat of this sort of corporate behavior will increase; as patent
applicants take advantage of the Federal Circuit’s decision, infringement
suits may grow in complexity and expense, thus favoring the side with
deeper pockets. This threat of strategic litigation in the patent context
has already been used in technical fields to eliminate competitors. In the
1980s, Eastman Kodak was forced to stop production of instant cameras
in response to infringement litigation initiated by Polaroid.170
4. The Impact on the PTO
The yearly number of patents issued by the PTO has risen from less
than 100,000 twenty years ago to almost twice that in 2001.171 In
167. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996) (quoting
Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 338 (1853)).
168. Michael J. Meurer, Business Method Patents and Patent Floods, 8 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 309, 310 (2002).
169. Bloomberg News, Bristol-Myers Agrees to Halt Patent Tactics, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 2003, at C3. The charges concerned several anticancer drugs (Taxol and
Platinol) as well as the antianxiety drug BuSpar. Id. Bristol-Myers earns almost $2
billion annually from the sale of these drugs. Id.
170. See Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 641 F. Supp. 828, 877–78 (D.
Mass. 1985).
171. Typically, sixty-five percent of patent applications result in patents; logically,
then the number of applications the PTO must process is much higher. Mark A. Lemley,
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2001); see also
United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Counts: States and Countries of
Origin Calendar Year 2001, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/
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addition, recent advances in the life science industry have resulted in a
flood172 of patent applications relating to DNA sequences, further
straining the ability of the PTO to adequately perform their screening
function.173 The Enzo result may add momentum to this flood, as the
relaxed written description standards could encourage more applicants to
strike while the iron is hot.
Even if the PTO can adequately cope with an ever-increasing number
of DNA sequence patent applications, the lowered written description
standards pose a further problem in the prior art174 context. When a
prospective patentee submits an application to the PTO, she is also
obliged to turn in any prior art of which she is aware.175 She is not,
however, required to search for prior art.176 This approach puts the
burden for prior art searches entirely on the patent examiner, who will,
for the average patent application, spend a total of eighteen hours
examining it.177 Historically, when considering the novelty178 of an
invention, patent examiners looked to scholarly publications as well as
previously issued patents for prior art.179 Patent examiners also use prior
art to determine whether an invention is obvious.180 It would seem that

taf/st_co_01.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
172. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross-Licenses, Patent Pools,
and Standard-Setting, 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 3 (Adam Jaffe et al.
eds., 2001), available at http://haas.berkeley.edu/~shapiro/thicket.pdf (last visited Apr. 5,
2003).
173. Lemley, supra note 167, at 1499–1500.
174. Prior art is “the entire body of knowledge from the beginning of time to the
present.” Walter J. Blenko, Jr., Considering What Constitutes Prior Art in the United
States, J. MINERALS, METALS & MATERIALS SOC’Y, June 1991, at 45. Relevant prior art
is that which bears some relation to the patentee’s invention. ELIAS, supra note 65, at
278.
175. Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2002).
176. Id. Many patent applicants (or more accurately, their attorneys) do conduct
their own prior art search before filing their patent so as to better craft their own patent
claims. Id. Presumably, the prior art turned up by the applicant is turned over to the
PTO, as good faith is required from prospective patentees. Id.
177. Lemley, supra note 167, at 1500. These eighteen hours represent the entire
time spent on an average patent application over the two to three years the patent is being
considered by the PTO. Id.
178. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). Inventions must be novel to gain a patent. If the
subject matter of the application is not novel, it adds nothing to the store of technology in
the public domain, and thus there is no reason to award a patent.
179. MERGES ET AL., supra note 43, at 168.
180. 35 U.S.C. § 103. Inventions cannot be obvious improvements over that which
is already in the public domain. If the improvement were obvious, there would be no
reason to reward the effort with a patent. As stated by the Supreme Court, “Unless more
ingenuity and skill . . . were required . . . than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic
acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity
which constitute essential elements of every invention.” Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52
U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850).
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if eighteen hours were insufficient181 to conduct a thorough search of the
prior art and determine the patentability of an application pre-Enzo, the
burden upon examiners will surely mount as written descriptions
increasingly refer to ATCC deposit numbers. While these deposits may
convince one of ordinary skill in the art that an inventor possessed the
invention as well as knew identifying characteristics as to the structure,
deposits likely will not be as helpful to the average patent examiner.
B. Broad Impact of Enzo: Problems Inherent to Patenting
Basic Research
While the impact of Enzo will certainly be felt in the short-term, it is
perhaps the broader repercussions of the decision that pose the greatest
risk. Because the case concerned a human DNA sequence, the decision
could have a devastating effect on many “downstream” uses for the
information, such as diagnostics and treatment. By making it easier for
an applicant to obtain a DNA sequence patent, the Federal Circuit has
enabled the patentee to make it more difficult, and thus more expensive,
for everyone else to work with the particular sequence.
1. Transaction Costs
Just as the public benefits from the spread of technology promoted by
our patent system, the public also incurs costs from it. Two of the costs
commonly associated with patents are social costs and transaction costs.
Social costs are the negative impacts caused by business operations,182
such as noise or pollution. Transaction costs are those costs generated
through the research, negotiation, and time investments associated with
entering into contracts.183 Transaction costs can vary greatly; obviously
a merger between two multinationals will create higher transaction costs
than purchasing a used car. Usual types of transaction costs include
search and information costs,184 bargaining costs,185 and enforcement

181. This is a common complaint of the PTO’s procedures. See, e.g., John H.
Barton, Reforming the Patent System, 287 SCIENCE 1933, 1933–34 (2000).
182. R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 95 (1988).
183. Johnson, supra note 11.
184. Search and information costs include the expense of developing background
information on technology, the market, and competitors. Id.
185. Bargaining costs include the time and finances expended during (as well as in
preparation for) negotiations. Id.
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costs.186 By the Coase Theorem, any initial allocation of property rights
will still result in the most efficient outcome, as long as transaction
costs are zero.187 However, if there are transaction costs, the Theorem
suggests that the initial allocation of property rights will be critical to
reaching the most efficient outcome.188
There are always transaction costs involved with patent licenses, often
in all three of the categories (research, negotiation, and enforcement
expenses) described above. Bargaining costs rise as the parties involved
in the negotiation hammer out the terms of the agreement.189 Enforcement
costs may accrue as one side attempts to police the other to ensure
compliance with the contract. Should a dispute arise, the expense of
lawyers and litigation can quickly outweigh the benefits provided by the
license.190 Search and information costs are incurred through research of
the prior art in the field (to identify the relevant players and scope) as
well as the patent itself. Therefore, the initial allocation of property
rights to the patentee is critical in achieving the most efficient outcome.
In Coase terms, Enzo could increase transaction costs by requiring more
investment in searches and information processing, while at the same
time making the initial allocation of property rights more difficult.
Enzo could increase the costs of information to prospective licensees
by making it harder to find relevant prior art. Just as the usual sources of
prior art cited by the PTO are issued patents and scholarly writings,191
licensees also utilize these sources. The problem facing licensees is the
same one that post-Enzo examiners may face: How does one determine
the exact scope of a patent that references a deposit number to satisfy the
written description requirement? While licensees may not be under the
same time and budget constraints as the PTO, their investment of time
and money in hopes of determining the scope of the patent of interest
186. Id.
187. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15, 19 (1960). The
theorem also assumes that the two parties desire an agreement. Robert Merges,
Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents,
62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 82 (1994). However, this assumption may fail as parties behave
strategically. Id. Of course, patent holders may indeed behave strategically, and the
likelihood of this occurring would seem to increase as patent boundaries lose their
precision. Id.
188. COASE, supra note 182, at 114–19.
189. Generic licensing agreements tend to reduce this aspect of transaction costs
through the establishment of routine procedures and forms. In addition, as the players in
a given field become familiar with the terms of the generic agreement, negotiations may
be further streamlined. Interview with Owen Smigelski, Of Counsel, David R. Preston
& Assocs., in San Diego, Cal. (April 19, 2004).
190. If the case goes to trial, much of the cost is an externality to the parties
involved because the public pays much of the cost of the court system. Johnson, supra
note 11.
191. MERGES ET AL., supra note 43, at 168.
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will be reflected in transaction cost increases. These increases in the
“cost of doing business” may discourage some licensees, and those that
persist in their efforts to license will pass these increased costs on to
their customers.
As transaction costs increase, the initial allocation of property rights
rises in importance.192 In our patent system, the PTO makes these initial
allocations based on the submitted application as well as patent
prosecution193 in an attempt to balance the competing interests of the
inventor, who wants expansive rights, and the public, who wants to limit
monopolies. It is hard to imagine that the job of the PTO will be made
any easier by a regime allowing inventors to gain monopoly rights with a
lesser disclosure. Thus, Enzo may well have a snowball effect in the
sense that the decision itself could trigger a rise in transaction costs for
the reasons previously described. This rise in transaction costs will in
turn make the initial allocation of property rights even more important.
However, this initial allocation itself has become more difficult postEnzo because of the relaxed disclosure standard. As the Enzo decision
made the job of the PTO more difficult, it has also made it more
important.
2. The Tragedy of the Commons or Anticommons
In 1968, Garrett Hardin published his seminal work on issues relating
to commonly held resources.194 In it he described what he termed the
“tragedy of the commons,” a situation where it is to one’s benefit to
overuse a commonly held resource, because the harm caused by the
overuse is borne by others—that is, it is externalized relative to the overuser.195 Further, as the resource at issue is commonly held, no parties
have the right to exclude anyone else from exploiting it, and thus no one
can protect the resource. In the situation before us, the commonly held
resource is the genome, the sum of all the DNA that makes us human.
By Hardin’s theory, it would be rational for parties to attempt to overuse
the resource196 as the costs of such overuse are not borne by the over192. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
193. Patent prosecution refers to the correspondence between an applicant and the
examiner. BitLaw, Patent Prosecution, at http://www.bitlaw.com/patent/prosecution.html
(last visited Apr. 5, 2003).
194. Hardin, supra note 30.
195. Id. at 1244.
196. In a genomic context, resource overuse is demonstrated by companies
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user alone, but shared by us all. Though such exploitive behavior may
be rational for the party benefiting, it ultimately leads to the tragedy of
resource depletion.197 Thus, one can see that commonly held resources
are vulnerable to exploitation, so a mechanism to prevent such overuse is
appropriate. In the context of the genome, one such protection
mechanism is the patent system.
The PTO serves as a check on the ability of users to exploit the
commonly held resource of our genome by limiting patentees to
claiming only that which they have invented. However, there is a
corollary to the “tragedy of the commons,” the “tragedy of the
anticommons,”198 wherein many parties have the power to exclude. A
resource can effectively become blocked as a result of the multitude of
parties holding property rights in it, and as the number of parties to a
negotiation increases, transaction costs can soar. This rise in transaction
costs leads to resource under-use, as seen in land development
evolutions in the United States199 and elsewhere.200 Typically, a tragedy
of the anticommons results from resource “fragmentation” to the point
where efficient use of the resource requires coordination or negotiation
between the vast numbers of owners. In feudal societies, fragmentation
could result from families (or the feudal lord) dividing the land as it
passed to younger generations.201 More analogous to the situation
concerning DNA patents is the example of homesteading in the
American West,202 where vast numbers of people facing a large resource
obtained exclusionary rights to small parts of it. As with the
homesteaders, patentees holding small DNA sequences may find it
economically unfeasible to develop their invention. Further, these
patentees could lack the resources necessary to bear the large transaction
costs of coordinating or negotiating with those holding neighboring
sequences. Finally, due to the increased transaction costs, it is possible
patenting as much of the genome as possible.
197. Hardin, supra note 30, at 1244–45.
198. Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163,
1166 n.8 (1999).
199. Id. at 1172. This problem arose from the small homesteads granted in some
parts of the country. Id. The parcels were too small to farm effectively, and they could
not be sold before the homesteader acquired complete ownership. Id. Further, even if
the owner were able to sell, what would the buyer want with a plot of farmland too small
to be effectively farmed? Id. The prospective buyer could also try to buy the neighbor’s
farm, and the next neighbor’s, and the next, but as more participants enter the
negotiations and transaction costs rise, this is less likely to happen. Id. Many of these
homesteads were eventually abandoned. Id.
200. Id. at 1171 (describing the effects of “fragmentation,” or dividing a resource to
the point where it can no longer be used efficiently).
201. Id. at 1171 n.34.
202. Id. at 1171–72.
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that no one will be willing to shoulder this task. This danger is inherent
in the situation currently faced by the life science industry and would be
difficult to overcome even if patent boundaries were crystal clear. Of
course, patent boundaries have never been so precise, but consider the
situation post-Enzo: Under the relaxed written description standards the
Federal Circuit seemed to advocate, transaction costs are almost sure to
increase as companies and researchers are forced to discern the limits of
already issued patents. Coupled with the PTO practice of awarding
patents on small DNA sequences,203 these higher transaction costs seem
to create an environment ripe for the “tragedy of the anticommons”
discussed by Michael Heller.
Of course, the ultimate impact of Enzo upon the life science industry
cannot yet be discerned, but history does provide a glimpse of what can
happen with developing technology that evolves absent strong patent
protection. In testimony before the Federal Trade Commission and the
Department of Justice on the topic of competition and intellectual
property law, Yale President Richard Levin described the differences in
perception as to patent protection among various industries.204 Levin
noted that while firms in most industries believed their competitive
advantages were best protected by being the first to market rather than
through the patent system, certain pharmaceutical and chemical
industries felt quite strongly that patents were the best protection of the
fruits of their R&D efforts.205 In part, this pro-patent outlook developed
because, in these industries, the nature of the technology dictated
discrete inventions such that patents on one molecule did not impact the
203. Ed Susman, U.S. PTO to Allow Patents on Gene Fragments Called EST’s,
BIOTECH. NEWSWATCH (Mar. 3, 1997). ESTs, or Express Sequence Tags, are short
sequences that are of sufficient length to identify the specific gene of which they are a
part. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. However, ESTs may be patented with
no more stated utility than for use as probes. Id. Thus, one may patent an EST without
knowing what the particular identified gene does. Susman, supra. This practice of
allowing patents on small DNA sequences increases fragmentation of the resource, and
thus fragmentation itself raises transaction costs by increasing the number of parties who
have exclusionary rights. Beyond transaction cost issues, a further danger of
fragmentation of resources is that, just as thermodynamics dictate, it is easier to break
things up than it is to put them back together.
204. FTC/DOJ Joint Hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property Law (Feb.
6, 2002) (testimony of Richard C. Levin). Mr. Levin directed a 1980s Yale research
program on the economic impact of intellectual property, and he currently co-chairs a
National Academies’ Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy committee
on Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge-Based Economy. Id.
205. Id.
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work of others—a patent on one chemical structure rarely prevented
competitors from patenting others. However, in industries where
progress tended to be cumulative, that is, building upon the work of
others, strong patent protection on early research could actually function
as a detriment to progress. In 1982, Levin described the nascent
semiconductor industry206 in which innovations in both basic research as
well as more developed applications drove the evolution of the
technology at a pace that would have been impossible to attain in an
environment where basic research was quickly patented.207 In light of
the current state of the science industry, in which cumulative development
has become the norm rather than the exception, does it make sense to
lessen the requirements for patenting basic research?
V. PROPOSALS
As stated, Enzo created problems on two levels: First, by relaxing the
written description requirement, the decision relieved patentees of the
responsibility of determining the bounds of their claims. Because these
bounds are crucial to both researchers in similar fields as well as to
courts making infringement determinations, the boundaries will still
have to be mapped, only now the patent holder will not bear the cost.
The simplest solution to the Enzo problem is to reverse the decision and
return to the regime established in Lilly. In Lilly the Federal Circuit
indicated that satisfaction of the written description requirement entailed
more than a demonstration of proof of possession; the inventor must
describe the invention in detail.208 A return to the Lilly standard would
eliminate the written description loophole endorsed in Enzo and force
inventors to delay patenting until they could adequately identify their
inventions. In the case of DNA sequence patents, this degree of
identification would require patentees to sequence the DNA, rather than
forcing others to do so. Further, while the relaxed written description
standards indicated by Enzo obviously apply to DNA sequence patents,
in no way are they limited to that field. Enzo may enable patent
applicants in diverse fields to circumvent the spirit of the written
description requirement and patent their inventions with minimal
disclosure, thus impairing the traditional quid pro quo inherent in the
U.S. patent system. A recent Federal Circuit case has already applied
Enzo beyond the life sciences. In Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation,
206. Richard C. Levin, The Semiconductor Industry, in GOVERNMENT AND
TECHNICAL PROGRESS: A CROSS-INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 9 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 1982).
207. Id. at 82.
208. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
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Inc.,209 the court cited Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.210
(which cited Enzo’s written description criteria) to support the
conclusion that the written description requirement was satisfied when
the inventor has demonstrated possession of the invention.211
On a larger scale, Enzo added to the dangers inherent in granting
patents on basic research by making it easier to patent inventions whose
limits are unknown. These basic research patents can impede the
development of entire industries by removing technology from public
reach, making further study or development impossible or prohibitively
expensive.
A similar situation arose almost a century ago, after the Wright
Brothers’ groundbreaking flights at Kitty Hawk. At the time of those
initial powered flights, the Wrights stood poised at the threshold of a
new technology, much like the DNA researchers of today. Subsequent
to those flights, the Wrights applied for and were awarded patents on
their aircraft technology. These basic research patents stifled the U.S.
aircraft industry until the government finally intervened.212 This
209. 325 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (addressing a patent dispute surrounding eggsorting equipment).
210. 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
More recently, in Enzo Biochem, we clarified that Eli Lilly did not hold that all
functional descriptions of genetic material necessarily fail as a matter of law to
meet the written description requirement; rather, the requirement may be
satisfied if in the knowledge of the art the disclosed function is sufficiently
correlated to a particular, known structure.
Id. at 1332.
211. Moba, B.V., 325 F.3d at 1320. “The test for compliance with § 112 has always
required sufficient information in the original disclosure to show that the inventor
possessed the invention at the time of the original filing.” Id. The court went on to state
that in “Enzo and Amgen, the record showed that the specification that taught one of skill
in the art to make and use an invention also convinced that artisan that the inventor
possessed the invention.” Id. at 1321. This seems to collapse the written description
requirement to one of merely enablement (at least in some fields), which is an
interpretation that is not entirely supported by precedent. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text. This interpretation of § 112 does have its proponents, among them
is Judge Rader, who concurred in Moba:
The language of § 112, ¶ 1 indicates that a patent will contain an adequate
description if it provides enough information to enable a person skilled in the
art to make and use the invention. Any disclosure that enables one to make
and use the invention also, by definition, also shows that the inventor was in
possession of that full invention. Consequently, the erroneous written
description requirement of Lilly case lacks both a statutory and a logical
foundation.
Moba, B.V., 325 F.3d at 1323 (Rader, J., concurring).
212. Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights
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illustrates the dangers that can manifest when basic research is “locked”
through the patent system. In the Wright Brothers’ example, the grant of
a patent at the nascent stage of industry development crippled progress
such that U.S. fliers in World War I flew British or French aircraft.213
Only in Europe, where the U.S. patents had no legal authority, could a
dynamic aircraft industry develop. Eventually, the U.S. government
intervened, with the Secretary of the Navy urging the creation of an
agreement providing for automatic cross-licensing.214
In the DNA sequence context, the U.S. government could establish
compulsory cross-licensing arrangements whereby the patent holder’s
exclusionary rights were relaxed in return for a fee paid by those
interested in working with the patented sequence. This would lessen the
“tragedy of the anticommons” danger inherent to patents on basic
research by maintaining public access to the raw materials of genetic
research.
A similar solution has proven effective in the automobile industry,
preserving competition as well as reducing transaction costs.215 In the
music field, the American Society of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers (ASCAP) provides a blanket license that allows buyers access
to all of the songs from the catalog.216 While these sorts of arrangements
can raise antitrust issues,217 they provide an efficient mechanism to aid
in the dissemination of technology, which was, after all, the goal of the
patent system in the first place.
VI. CONCLUSION
The scientific profession has changed tremendously in the last few
hundred years; no longer is it limited to the landed classes and
bourgeoisie.218 Just as the demographics of the profession have
changed, perhaps the motivations have as well.219 Though society has
enjoyed countless benefits derived from the efforts of those pushing the
and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 131–32 (1999).
213. EZRA BOWEN, KNIGHTS OF THE AIR 148–53 (1980).
214. George Bittlingmayer, Property Rights, Progress, and the Aircraft Patent
Agreement, 31 J.L. & ECON. 227, 232 (1988).
215. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting
Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1950–51 (2002).
216. Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 55, 111 (2001).
217. Lemley, supra note 215, at 1951.
218. See generally Krimsky, supra note 1.
219. Id. at 15. The author notes the increasing number of “associations” between
academic researchers and industry, including research grants, private gifts, and
confidentiality agreements between researchers and the funding companies. Id. at 28–
31.
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envelope of scientific knowledge, it must be careful to ensure that the
fruits of scientific labor continue to benefit society as a whole, instead of
merely profiting the latest version of the bourgeoisie described by
Sheldon Krimsky.220 In the context of the human genome, the PTO
must act as trustee for the benefit of human kind by protecting the single
thing that all humans share—our genetic heritage. By making it easier
to obtain a patent, the Federal Circuit has shifted stewardship of our
genetic heritage to parties whose motivations are subject to question221
and effectively limited the power of the PTO to protect our most
important resource.
Today, one can sequence a DNA sample quickly and inexpensively,
sparing the would-be DNA patentee the “Herculean effort”222 Judge Dyk
feared in Enzo. However, the harm Enzo caused is not limited to diagnostic
probes, but rather lies in the attenuated disclosure requirements the
decision created. The Federal Circuit’s lowering of the bar to patentability
220. Id. at 15. As an example of the differing end result achieved when a public
organization owns a gene patent as opposed to a private entity, Krimsky describes two
genetic screening tests. Id. at 37. One of the tests diagnoses Tay Sachs disease, and the
gene patent is held by the Department of Health and Human Services. Id. A screening
test for Tay Sachs costs around $100. Id. In contrast, a screening test for breast cancer
involving the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes (patent held by Myriad Genetics) costs $2400.
Id.
221. In response to an increasing number of AIDS related deaths, South Africa
passed legislation in 1997 that, in effect, allowed it to circumvent U.S. patent laws.
Shawna Williams, Innovation vs. Access: Two Epidemics Transform the Pharmaceutical
Patent Law Debate into an International Controversy, 8 J. YOUNG INVESTIGATORS (May
2002), at http://www.jyi.org/volumes/volume5/issue8/features/williams.html.
The
legislation allowed importation of drugs from countries that lacked drug patent
protection as long as the patent holder was paid a fee. Id. Almost immediately, a U.S.
pharmaceutical association began lobbying to persuade the Clinton Administration to
pressure South Africa into changing the new laws. Id. The United States then warned
South Africa that trade sanctions could result from the legislation. Id. In 1998, the trade
association filed suit, naming Nelson Mandela as the “First Responder.” Id. After two
years of bad publicity regarding the lawsuit, the association dropped the action. Id.
It is currently estimated that by 2006 the number of AIDS-related fatalities in South
Africa will be approximately 250,000 annually, rising to 500,000 annually by 2008.
AIDS Foundation of South Africa, AIDS in South Africa, at http://www.
aids.org.za/aids_in_south_africa.htm (last updated July 28, 2003). By 2008, the average
life expectancy in South Africa will have plunged from approximately sixty years to
approximately forty years. Id. In contrast, the Bush administration considered
overriding the patent on the Anthrax drug Cipro after fewer than twenty cases were
reported in the United States. Williams, supra. As of this writing, the Bush
administration has indicated support for a change in World Trade Organization policy to
allow countries facing public health emergencies to seek patent waivers. Id.
222. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 285 F.3d 1013, 1026 n.2 (Fed. Cir.
2002), vacated by 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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could hamstring the U.S. life science industry by inhibiting research and
investment. The court’s decision could also force consumers to bear everincreasing health care costs by making basic research easier to patent.
These basic research patents in turn drive up the cost of health care by
creating a thicket of transaction costs that deter innovation by making
the pursuit of new drugs and treatments in heavily patented fields
prohibitively expensive.
Perhaps Enzo will not be the Dred Scott223 of patent jurisprudence, a
bitter reminder of the dangers of ignoring the forest for the trees. In
such a dynamic field, the harm Enzo caused can be readily corrected.
Hopefully it will be soon.
HAL GIBSON

223. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (holding that Dred Scott was
to remain a slave and that the Federal Government had no authority to prohibit slavery in
new territories, thereby invalidating the Missouri Compromise and continuing the United
States in its march towards the Civil War).
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